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Abstract 
Previous studies have investigated whether Chinese exports have crowded out those 
from other countries. However, what has yet to be considered is the evidence by 
different quality varieties. Using the most detailed Harmonized System nine-digit 
product-level data, the present paper provides evidence of crowding-out and crowded-
out effects across different product quality segments and across manufacturing sectors 
by quality segments. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that the 
crowding-out effects of Chinese exports have been greatest at the lower end of the 
quality spectrum but less significant at the higher quality spectrum. Moreover, since 
2007 China’s own exports of lower quality manufactured goods have been increasingly 
crowded out. The key policy implication is that China’s export path is in line with that 
taken by other Asian economies in previous decades; the crowded-out effect could 
achieve win–win outcomes for countries involved; and lower income countries would 
do well to be open to receive those relocated low value-added industries from China. 
However, the relocation policy in China is best implemented gradually as climbing up 
the product quality ladder takes time. 
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I. Introduction
China’s success in penetrating global markets has been widely documented(Du and Lu, 
2018). In 2009, China became the world’s largest exporting nation. By 2016, China’s 
share of global goods exports had reached 13.6 percent, more than 4 percentage points 
higher than the USA in second place(World Trade Organization, 2017). This has given 
rise to a view that China’s success has come at the expense of other countries and an 
extensive academic literature on the crowding-out effect of China’s exports on its rivals 
has ensued(Holst and Weiss, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2008; Batista and Liu, 2017). 
At the same time, however, a significant proportion of China’s exports have come 
from foreign companies themselves, as they have relocated their production and 
assembly plants to take advantage of lower wage costs as well as other locational 
advantages such as high quality infrastructure. The latest data from China’s customs 
administration show that foreign-funded enterprises currently account for 42.8 percent 
of China’s total exports(CEIC, 2017).  
Much of China’s export success came during a period when China was classified 
as a low and lower–middle income country. Since 2010, wage increases have pushed 
China into the upper–middle income bracket of countries as defined by the World Bank. 
Manufacturing wages in China are now higher than in all South-East Asian countries 
apart from Singapore. At the same time, there is evidence that in some of China’s major 
export destinations, such as Japan, China’s exports are themselves now being crowded 
out by competition from third countries (Figure 1). Just as China has historically 
benefited from high-income countries relocating their industrial facilities, there is 
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evidence that Chinese firms are increasingly following suit by setting up in locations 
such as Vietnam, Bangladesh and Ethiopia. That is, there is anecdotal evidence that 
rather than China presenting a unique threat to the exports of other countries, it is 
proceeding along a familiar “flying geese” development path, outlined first by 
Akamatsu(1962). 
Figure 1. Market Share of China in Japan’s Manufacturing Imports 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan.  
 
This paper aims to provide a more nuanced assessment of China’s export path and its 
implications. The major contribution is to consider changes in China’s market share not 
at an aggregate level, but rather at the level of different product quality segments. For 
example, it may be that China has mostly made gains in market share with respect to 
low value-added products but has yet to displace those countries supplying at the higher 
end of the quality distribution. Alternatively, as wages in China have risen it may be 
that China’s own exports of lower value-added products have been crowded out, and 
whether China has, in turn, been able to displace higher value-added products produced 
by other countries needs to be empirically determined. 






















































methodology is adopted to measure the crowding-out effect, which can result from both 
direct competition and also industrial relocation. The particular context considered in 
this paper is Japan’s import market for manufactured goods. This is because China is a 
major supplier to this market, manufactured goods comprise a range of quality segments 
and also because Japanese import data are available at an extremely high level of 
product disaggregation, thus facilitating a detailed analysis of “crowding out” or being 
“crowded out” in different quality segments.  
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to identify the shift from 
the crowding-out effect of China’s exports to the crowded-out effects with respect to 
its ASEAN and East Asian neighbors.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of China’s 
export performance in the Japanese market for imported manufactured goods. Section 
III details the methodology and data, followed by the presentation and discussion of 
results in Section IV. Section V summarizes the findings and highlights policy 
implications. Section VI concludes.  
II. The performance of China’s Export and the Crowding-out 
Effect 
China’s share in Japan’s manufacturing imports grew enormously, from 14.6 percent in 
1996 to 38.5 percent in 2012. It reached a maximum of 38.9 percent in 2013 and 
thereafter experienced a slight decline. 
Table 1. Macro Market Share by Countries/Regions (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
5 
1996 2002 2007 2012 2016 
China 14.6 24.8 32.3 38.5 36.1 
ASEAN 13.9 14.9 13.8 14.3 16.1 
Singapore 2.6 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Malaysia 3.6 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 
Thailand 3.2 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Indonesia 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.4 
Philippines 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.8 
Vietnam 0.4 0.8 1.1 2.1 3.6 
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Korea 5.5 5.4 6.3 5.9 4.8 
Taiwan, China 5.2 5.5 4.7 4.5 5.0 
Hong Kong, China 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
India 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 
USA–Canada 28.9 21.5 15.9 12.5 13.2 
Western Europe 21.8 19.7 17.4 16.9 17.4 
Middle and South America 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Africa 1.1 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.0 
ROW 5.3 4.2 4.4 3.2 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
In comparison with China, the change in share of ASEAN countries was small. 
Within ASEAN there were different patterns. As a high-income country, Singapore’s 
share dropped from 2.6 percent in 1996 to 1.4 percent in 2007 and remained stable 
thereafter. Upper–middle income Malaysia dropped continuously, from 3.6 percent in 
1996 to 2.3 percent in 2016. Thailand’s share increased prior to 2007 and then remained 
stable. The share of the Philippines tended to fluctuate. Vietnam gained the most, with 
its share increasing from 0.4 percent in 1996 to 3.6 percent in 2016, thus making it the 
second largest exporter within ASEAN. The underdeveloped ASEAN members of 
Cambodia and Myanmar have only just begun to gain a small market share in recent 
periods, while Lao and Brunei are excluded from the analysis in this paper because they 
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still possess an insignificant share.  
Two of China’s major exporting neighbors, Korea and China’s Taiwan, each 
accounts for around a 5-percent share.  
The greatest decline was in the share of high-income USA–Canada, from 28.9 
percent in 1996 to 12.5 percent in 2012, albeit with a minor recovery through to 2016. 
Western Europe’s share also dropped considerably but the magnitude is less than USA–
Canada’s. This aligns with evidence reported by Fontagné et al.(2008) that Western 
Europe has been more resilient than the USA in facing rising exports from China. 
Such dynamics in the Japanese market have occurred in other markets too. This 
has given rise to a literature studying the crowding-out effects of China’s exports (Anh-
Dao, 2010; Batista and Liu, 2017; Lin, 2015). Earlier studies with aggregate data often 
resulted in inconsistent findings. For example, Eichengreen et al. (2007) studied the 
impact of Chinese exports on 13 Asian exporting countries using aggregate trade data 
as well as SITC 1-digit and 3-digit data for 1990–2003. The main conclusions reached 
were that China’s growth had a positive effect on exports of high-income (Japan, 
Singapore and Korea) and middle-income (Malaysia and the Philippines) countries but 
a negative effect on low-income Asian countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan). In contrast, also using aggregate data for 1990–2003, Greenaway et al. 
(2008)conclude that there is no evidence of export displacement for low-income 
countries(Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam), which have a 
comparative advantage in unskilled labor-intensive goods and find, instead, that it was 




Such discrepancies have induced follow-up studies. For example, Eichengreen et 
al.(2007)finds that all else being equal, a 10-percent increase in Chinese exports to a 
particular market results in a 0.6-percent decline in the sales of competing Asian 
countries in that market. Similarly, Baak(2014)estimates the crowding-out effect of 
China’s exports on Korea’s exports using econometric methods and Japan’s 
Harmonized System (HS)nine-digit-level import data. This indicates that if the Chinese 
unit price of a commodity decreases by 1 percent, the demand for Korean exports of 
the commodity decreases by 0.34 percent. Although these studies offer valuable 
quantitative estimates of the crowding-out effect, they do not address issues around 
quality heterogeneity of traded products.  
Some previous studies have demonstrated that decomposing trade flows into 
quality segments makes it possible to more accurately measure the magnitude of the 
crowding-out effect. Scott (2004) argues that thinking about international specialization 
must shift away from industries and toward segments(with low, medium or high quality) 
within products to further investigate competition among exporters. Fontagné et 
al.(2008)concludes that the more detailed the product classification, the less 
competition among exporters. The present study shows that countries at different 
development levels sell quality-differentiated segments of the same products at very 
different prices and, thus, these countries do not compete directly because they are not 
positioned in the same market segment. A similar exercise was conducted between 
China and Vietnam(Anh-Dao, 2010).Such comparative studies show that a country’s 
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export growth in market value or market share in one quality segment of a given product 
does not mean it will crowd out the growth of other countries competing in another 
quality segment of the same product. By way of illustration, the export of a pair of 
US$50 leather shoes with low quality is unlikely to crowd out the exports of a US$300 
pair of leather shoes of high quality. This means that it is necessary to consider product 
quality segmentation before estimating the crowding-out effect.  
III. Methodology and Data 
1. Quality Segmentation 
Following Fontagné et al. (2008), each trade flow is divided into different quality 
segments. Classification proceeds as follows. The relative unit value ratio for any trade 
flow of product i exported by country j to a given importing market k is denoted as: 
/ijk ijk ikr uv uv= .The ijkuv  is the unit value for the trade flow of product I exported by 
country j to a given importing market k and ikuv  is the trade-weighted (geometric) 
average of the unit value of product i exported by all exporting countries in the given 
importing market, k. 
If 1ijkr <  then the value of trade flow of product I exported by country j is divided 
into the low-quality and medium-quality segments. 
If 1ijkr >  then the value of trade flow of product i exported by country j is divided 
into the medium-quality and high-quality segments. 
If 1ijkr =   then the value of trade flow of product I exported by country j is 
ascribed to the medium-quality segments. See Equation (1): 
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Following Fontagné et al. (2008), we set the smoothness parameter α to be 4so as to 
make each segment roughly equal to one-third of the world trade. 
2. Decomposition and Distribution of the Crowding-out Effect 
To measure the magnitude of the crowding-out effect, we employ the improved 
constant market shares (CMS) analysis method. The CMS has long been used in the 
research of export performance. The CMS model breaks down the change in the 
aggregated market share (or macro share)of a particular exporter into two main 
components: the direct competition effect, or the competitiveness effect, and the 
indirect competition effect, or the structural effect (Tyszynski, 1951; Fagerberg and 
Sollie, 1987; Holst and Weiss, 2004; Batista, 2008; Batista and Liu, 2017; Cheptea et 
al., 2014). 
In this paper, we argue that the first component is a mixture of a competitiveness 
effect and an industry relocation effect because the micro market share gain in product 
level may be due to either direct competition against rivals or relocation of production 
facilities. Therefore, unlike previous literature, we refer to it as a crowding-out effect 





+∆ is the aggregated macro market share change of country j in the 
importing country k from the initial year t to the final year t + 1.
1 1( / ,... / ..., / )
t t t t t t t
ijk jk k ijk ik njk nkX M X M X M≡a is a row vector of dimension n of the 
micro shares of product i(i = 1,…n) exported by country j to a given importing 
market k in initial year t. tijkX  is the market value of trade flow of product I 
exported by country j to a given importing market kin initial year t. tikM is the 
market value of all trade flows of product I imported by a given importing market 
k in initial year t. 1( / ,... / ..., / )
t t t t t t t
ik k k ik k nk kM M M M M M≡b  is a column vector of 
dimension n of the shares of product I (i = 1,…n)in the total imports of country j 
in initial year t. 
The alternative form of CMS decomposition is as follows: 
. (3) 
As pointed out by Fagerberg and Sollie (1987), the CMS method can be 
considerably improved in terms of theoretical consistency as well as empirical 
applicability if initial years’ weights ( tikb , Laspeyres indices) are used throughout the 
calculations. Thus, we use the Laspeyres indices CMS model as shown in Equation (2) 
                                                             
1For dead products, which are imported in the initial year and not imported in the final year by Japan, COE is 
meaningless because there is no import demand and, consequently, no competition between rivals. However, 
according to the formula, COE for dead products is negative. Therefore, we exclude dead products in the following 
tables of CMS results. 
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to measure the crowding-out effect of China’s exports on other countries. 
Following Batista (2008), we further distribute the crowding-out effect of country 
j across its rivals as follows: 




+∆  is the part of the change in its macro market share of country j from 
initial year tto the final year t + 1 that can be ascribed to crowding out the export of 
country s. 1 1( / ,... / ..., / )
t t t t t t t
isk sk k isk ik nsk nkX M X M X M≡a  is a row vector of 
dimension n of the micro shares of product i (i = 1,…n) exported by country s to a given 
importing market k in initial year t and tiska  is introduced as above.
1, 1, 1, 1,
1COE ( ,... ,... )
t t t t t t t t
ijk jk ijk njkCOE COE COE
+ + + +≡  is a column vector of dimension n of the 
crowding-out effect in each individual product i(i = 1,…n)) exported by country j to a 
given importing market k from the initial year t to the final year t + 1;
1, 1, 1, 1,
1COE ( ,... ,... )
t t t t t t t t
isk sk isk nskCOE COE COE
+ + + +≡  is a column vector of dimension n of the 
crowding-out effect in each individual product i(i = 1,…n) exported by country s to a 
given importing market k from the initial year t to the final year t + 1; 
3. Data 
With the purpose of minimizing aggregation bias(Batista and Liu, 2017), this paper uses 
HS nine-digit Japanese import C.I.F. data, which is the most detailed data available. 
The annual data is from Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF). We define a HS nine-digit  
code as a product. A segment within a product refers to the low, medium or high-quality 
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segments within that product. This paper only considers products from chapter 28 to 96 
(manufactured products) for which information on values and quantities is available, 
thus allowing the calculation of unit values.  
The HS was introduced in 1988 and revised in1992, 1996, 2002, 2007 and 2012. 
To trace each product category consistently through time, we use the initial and end-
year data of our sub-periods: 1996–2001, 2002–2006, 2007–2011 and 2012–2016.An 
additional benefit of using the above sub-periods is as follows: China joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001 and comparisons between the first and 
subsequent sub-periods might show the crowding-out effect this had on China’s 
competitors. According to the World Bank, China became an upper–middle income 
country in 2010 and, thus, we can use the third sub-period to examine the impact of 
rising labor costs on the crowding-out effect. We would expect to see a negative impact, 
which might even be sufficient to tip a crowding-out effect to a crowded-out effect. 
Finally, as mentioned in Section II, China’s macro market share began to decline 
gradually on a year-on-year basis after 2013. Thus, the latest sub-period can be used to 
observe whether there has been a possible widening of the crowded-out effect. 
IV. Results 
1. Export Performance by Quality Segment 
(1) Market Share in Low Segment 
Table 2 shows that in the low-quality segment of China’s market share rose 
continuously before 2012 but fell thereafter. The fall in the last sub-period was 
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sufficient to return China’s market share to less than it was in 2007. It is notable that 
China’s market share in low-quality products is considerably higher than its macro 
market share shown in Table 1.  
Since China entered the WTO, ASEAN countries as a whole began to lose market 
share in the low-quality segment. Note that compared with the drop in ASEAN market 
share shown in Table 1, the drop in the low-quality segment in Table 2 is more dramatic. 
This shows the importance of considering product segmentation along a quality ladder. 
That said, in the most recent sub-period its share rose from 13.7to 16.5 percent. 
Within ASEAN, with the exception of Vietnam and Singapore, most member 
countries follow a rise–fall–rise pattern in their market shares. For instance, Thailand’s 
share rose from 4.4 percent in 1996 to 5.2 percent in 2002, then fell to 4.4 percent in 
2012 and finally rose to 4.8 percent in 2016. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s share rose 
continuously even in the years when ASEAN as a whole lost market share. By 2016, 
Vietnam followed only Thailand as an exporter in the low-quality segment. Singapore’s 
share experienced continuous decline. Singapore’s fall and Vietnam’s rise in the low-
quality segment appears consistent with the expected industrial relocation under the 
flying geese model.  
As important high-income trading partners of Japan, Korea’s share fluctuates more 
often, while China Taiwan’s share decreases continuously.  
The high-income USA–Canada’s share dropped significantly between 1996 and 
2002, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation of industrial relocation. The 
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high-income Western European countries only experienced modest declines in shares 
before 2012 and have gained slightly since then.  
Table 2.Market Share by Countries/regions in Low Segment (%) 
Country/region 1996 2002 2007 2012 2016 
China 30.1 43.3 51.4 52.6 47.4 
ASEAN 17.5 17.7 13.8 13.7 16.5 
Singapore 4.4 1.8 1.2 0.9 1.3 
Malaysia 4.2 4.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 
Thailand 4.4 5.2 4.6 4.4 4.8 
Indonesia 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Philippines 1.9 2.6 2.0 1.4 1.5 
Vietnam 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.0 3.4 
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Korea 5.6 6.3 4.8 5.3 5.7 
Taiwan, China 9.7 6.6 6.5 5.5 5.5 
Hong Kong, China 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
India 1.5 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 
USA–Canada 18.2 8.8 8.4 8.5 7.8 
Western Europe 11.5 11.6 10.3 10.1 11.4 
Middle and South America 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.7 
Africa 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 
ROW 3.2 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
(2) Market Share in Medium Segment 
Turning to Table 3, in the medium segment China continuously gained market 
share before 2012. After that, from 2012 to 2016, China’s share steadied. This may 
indicate that China’s comparative advantage currently rests with medium-quality 
products.  
Relative to China’s continuous gain of market share before 2012, ASEAN 
countries, as a whole, experienced a relatively stable share throughout the full period.  
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Table 3.Market Share by Countries/regions in Medium Segment (%) 
Country/region 1996 2002 2007 2012 2016 
China 12.4 25.9 34.7 45.3 45.1 
ASEAN 15.2 15.0 14.2 14.0 15.3 
Singapore 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.2 
Malaysia 4.6 3.5 2.5 2.2 1.9 
Thailand 3.2 3.4 3.8 4.0 3.5 
Indonesia 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.5 3.0 
Philippines 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.7 
Vietnam 0.4 0.8 1.1 2.1 3.6 
Cambodia 0.0 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.3 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Korea 5.2 5.5 5.3 6.9 4.8 
Taiwan, China 4.3 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.8 
Hong Kong, China 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
India 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
USA–Canada 33.5 23.4 16.4 9.9 11.5 
Western Europe 15.9 14.2 11.5 11.2 11.2 
Middle and South America 3.0 1.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 
Africa 2.1 2.4 3.9 2.1 1.9 
ROW 7.5 6.3 6.9 4.2 3.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
Among ASEAN countries, Singapore’s share fell and then rose. Malaysia lost 
market share continuously. Both Thailand and Indonesia gained market share first and 
then subsequently lost it, while the share of the Philippines moved irregularly. Vietnam 
also stands out in the medium-quality segment. Its share rose from just 0.4 percent in 
1996 to 3.6percent in 2016. It is now the largest ASEAN exporter to the Japanese 
market in the medium-quality segment. Both Cambodia and Myanmar experienced a 
rise in share between 2012 and 2016. Although the increase is minor in size, it is a 
significant advance for both countries. Myanmar doubled its share in 2016 relative to 
2012, while Cambodia tripled its share during the same sub-period. 
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Korea’s share and China Taiwan’s share are still bigger than that of any individual 
ASEAN economy. Both economies’ shares move irregularly. Different from in the low-
quality segment, the developed USA–Canada lost the biggest market share in the 
medium-quality segment, falling from 33.5 percent in 1996 to 9.9 percent in 2012. 
USA–Canada then registered a small recovery to 11.2 percent in 2016. Western 
Europe’s share also fell but the magnitude is small relative to USA–Canada. 
(3) Market Share in High Segment 
Although China has been the largest exporter in low and medium segments in 
Japan’s market, its share of the high segment is vastly lower. It accounted for only 1.2 
percent of Japan’s high-quality market in 1996, less than the shares of some ASEAN 
countries such as Singapore (1.6 percent), Malaysia (1.4 percent), Thailand (1.9 
percent)and the Philippines (1.5 percent). By 2016, China accounted for 5.4 percent, 
which saw it ranked fourth in the high-quality segment. Nonetheless, China still 
experienced a market share loss in the period 2012–2016 that was almost as large as the 
market share gain of ASEAN.  
ASEAN’s share of the high-quality segment increased continuously over the entire 
period. In particular, Vietnam has become the largest ASEAN exporter in this segment. 
Singapore doubled its share between 1996 and 2012 but then fell again in the most 
recent sub-period. Malaysia’s share rose significantly during the first two sub-periods 
and then steadied. Thailand’s share rose continuously and it has become the second 
largest ASEAN exporter in the high-quality segment following Vietnam. Indonesia’s 
17 
 
share was small and stable before 2012, and after that, it increased. The Philippines 
doubled its share between 1996 and 2002 and then moved irregularly. Not surprisingly, 
the underdeveloped members of Cambodia and Myanmar did not gain market share in 
the high-quality segment.  
Both Korea and China Taiwan’s shares moved irregularly. Although the share of 
high-income countries decreased between 1996 and 2016, they are still the largest 
source of Japanese high-quality imports. For USA–Canada, the largest drop in its share 
took place between 2002 and 2007. This was the period that Korea gained its largest 
share. For Western Europe, the largest drop in its share took place between 1996 and 
2002,when China’s Taiwan gained its largest market share. 
Table 4.Market Share by Countries/Regions in High-quality Segment (%) 
Country/region 1996 2002 2007 2012 2016 
China 1.2 2.6 3.8 6.6 5.4 
ASEAN 7.9 11.5 13.1 15.6 16.9 
Singapore 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.2 2.3 
Malaysia 1.4 2.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Thailand 1.9 2.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Indonesia 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.9 
Philippines 1.5 3.3 2.2 2.6 2.3 
Vietnam 0.3 0.7 1.1 2.3 3.9 
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Korea 5.9 4.4 9.9 4.7 3.8 
Taiwan, China 1.7 5.2 3.8 5.2 6.6 
Hong Kong, China 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
India 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 
      
USA–Canada 33.2 32.8 24.7 23.0 23.4 
Western Europe 42.7 36.6 36.8 36.9 36.4 
Middle and South America 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.4 
Africa 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.3 
ROW 3.8 2.7 3.7 4.0 3.9 
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
These results suggest that crowding-out effects may exist between any two 
exporting economies. However, changes in market share itself cannot be used to 
measure the crowding-out effect. Therefore, we utilize the CMS model and its extension, 
as shown in Equations (2) and (4),to decompose the market share change and then 
analyze the distribution of China’s crowding-out or crowded-out effect among rivals.  
2. The Relative Change of China’s Market Share to Its Competitors: Crowding-
out or Crowded-out Effect 
(1) Low-quality Segment 
According to Table 2, China’s market share in the low segment rose from 30.1 
percent in 1996 to 47.4 percent in 2016. Column (1) of Table 5showsthat the overall 
crowding-out effect of China was 14 percent more market share in the low-quality 
segment. Recall that this crowding out can reflect either direct competition or industrial 
relocation. Thus, the crowding-out effect accounts for 80.9 percent (14.0/17.3) of 
China’s market share change in the low segment. The remaining 19.1 percent can be 
attributed to the non-competitive structural effect. The high proportion of crowding out 
is indicative of China’s competitive advantage in the low-quality segment, as predicted 
by trade theory. With respect to the14-percentcrowding-out effect, 5.2 percent is from 
China’s Taiwan, 2.6 percent from Western Europe, 1.9 percent from Korea, 1.8 percent 
from ASEAN and 1.8 percent from USA–Canada. On the flipside, China was also 
crowded out by low-income countries such as Vietnam (−1.7 percent), Cambodia (−0.4 
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percent), Myanmar (−0.3 percent) and Bangladesh (−0.5 percent). This is consistent 
with the shift of manufacturing capacity from earlier developed Asian countries to 
China, and subsequent moves to less developed Asian countries, a typical pattern of 
industry relocation.  
 
Table 5. The Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect in Low Segment (%) 
Country/Region  











ASEAN 1.80 1.70 3.30 −0.70 −2.50 
Singapore 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 
Malaysia 1.3 0.3 1.3 −0.1 −0.2 
Thailand 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.0 −0.6 
Indonesia 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.0 −0.2 
Philippines 0.5 0.1 0.5 −0.1 −0.1 
Vietnam −1.7 −0.1 −0.2 −0.4 −1.0 
   Cambodia −0.4 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.3 
   Myanmar −0.3 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.2 
Korea 1.9 0.9 1.5 0.2 −0.7 
Taiwan, China 5.2 2.3 1.9 1.2 −0.3 
Hong Kong, China 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Bangladesh −0.5 0.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.3 
India −0.2 0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 
USA–Canada 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 
Western Europe 2.6 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.2 
Middle and South 
America 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.1 
Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Total  14.0 7.3 9.1 1.0 −3.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
When we break up the period into four sub-periods, a more detailed picture 
emerges. First, in the first two sub-periods in columns (2) and (3), apart from Vietnam, 
China crowds out all other exporting economies, especially its East Asian and ASEAN 
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neighbors, which confirms the crowding-out effect identified in the previous literature. 
Second, by the third sub-period in column (4),however, while China still crowds out 
high-income countries, it, in turn, began to be crowded out by most developing ASEAN 
countries, especially Vietnam and Bangladesh. Crowded-out effects emerge extensively 
for the first time for China in the low-quality segment. In the latest sub-period in column 
(5), the crowded-out effect has increased. China lost market share to all its neighboring 
East Asian and ASEAN member countries, except high income Singapore and USA–
Canada and Western European countries. Vietnam gained the largest share in the 
crowding out of China.  
(2) Medium-quality Segment 
As shown in column (1) of Table 6, in the medium-quality segment China gained 
8.9 percent through crowding out rivals. According to Table 3, China’s market share in 
this segment rose from 12.4 percent in 1996 to 45.1 percent in 2016. Thus, the 
crowding-out effect only accounts for 27.2 percent(8.9/32.6) of China’s total market 
share increase in the medium-quality segment, a much lower proportion than in the low-
quality segment.  
 
Table 6. Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect in Medium Segment (%) 
 
Country/region 











ASEAN 1.60 1.80 1.40 0.30 −2.20 
Singapore 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.2 −0.1 
Thailand 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.3 −0.1 
Indonesia 0.4 0.3 0.3 −0.1 −0.2 
Philippines 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 −0.1 
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Vietnam −1.6 0.1 0.0 −0.3 −1.4 
      Cambodia −0.3 −0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.2 
      Myanmar −0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 
Korea 3.2 0.8 0.9 0.3 1.3 
Taiwan, China 2.0 0.3 1.5 0.2 −0.1 
Hong Kong, China 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bangladesh −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 
India −0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
USA–Canada 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.1 
Western Europe −0.8 −1.4 0.5 0.2 −0.1 
Middle and South 
America 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ROW 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 −0.1 
Total 8.9 3.0 5.5 1.4 −1.1 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
In the early sub-periods in columns (2) and (3), China’s exports in the medium-
quality segment crowded out most other competitors, with the exception of Western 
Europe, Cambodia and Middle and South America. For the third sub-period in column 
(4), although the effect decreased to 1.4 percent, crowding out still occurred for most 
exporters, except Indonesia, Vietnam and India. The situation changed in the last sub-
period (column 5), during which China was crowded out by ASEAN and some East 
Asian neighbors. The exception is Korea and USA–Canada. China still gained 1.3 
percent and 0.1 percent market shares from them, respectively. Like the low-quality 
segment, Vietnam also made the largest gains in crowding out China. For the last two 
sub-periods, China lost 0.3 and 1.4 percent in market share to Vietnam. 
According to Table 3, China’s share declined from 45.3 percent in 2012 to 45.1 
percent in 2016.For the latest sub-period in column (5) in Table 6, China lost 1.1 percent 
market share in total. A relatively larger crowded-out effect is offset by the relatively 
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larger structural effect, which, in turn, stabilized the magnitude of market share losses.  
(3) High-quality Segment 
In the high-quality segment, according to Table 4, China’s market share rose from 
1.2 percent in 1996 to 5.4 percent in 2016. However, as shown in column (1) in Table 
7, China only gained 0.2 percent more market share between 1996 and 2016 in the high-
quality segment due to the crowding-out effect. This implies that the crowding-out 
effect only accounts for 4.8 percent(0.2/4.2) of China’s total market share increase in 
the high-quality segment, with the remaining market share gains coming from the non–
competitive structural effect. The low overall crowding-out effect displays the fact that 
China’s competitiveness is still modest in high-quality products relative to developed 
countries. 
In the first sub-period in column (2), we cannot observe a crowding-out effect of 
China’s exports on other ASEAN and East Asian countries. In the same sub-period, we 
can only observe a 0.2-percent crowding-out effect of China on high-income USA–
Canada and Western Europe.  
For the second sub-period in column (3), we can observe the crowding-out effect 
of China on some upper–middle and high-income ASEAN and East Asian economies, 
including Singapore, Thailand, Korea and China’s Taiwan. In addition, China still gains 
small market shares of 0.2 and 0.1 percent in crowding out high income USA–Canada 




In the latest sub-period in column (5), the market share of 1.2 percent by its rivals 
crowded out China. In this sub-period, we can observe for the first time the aggregate 
shift from the previous crowding-out effect to a crowded-out effect. China was crowded 
out by some ASEAN and East Asian economies, including Singapore (−0.2 percent), 
Malaysia (−0.1 percent), Thailand (−0.3 percent), Vietnam (−0.2 percent) and Korea 
(−0.1 percent). In addition, China was also crowded out by high income USA–Canada 
(−0.2 percent) and Western Europe countries (−0.1percent).  
Table 7. Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect in High Segment (%) 
Country/region 
 (1)       (2)      (3)       (4)       (5) 
 1996–16 1996–01 2002–06 2007–11 2012–16 
ASEAN -0.30 0.00 0.20 0.30 -0.60 
Singapore -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 
Malaysia -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
Thailand 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.3 
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Philippines 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Vietnam -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Korea, Rep. 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Taiwan, China 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Hong Kong, China 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
India  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USA–Canada  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 
Western Europe  0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Middle and South America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Africa  0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
ROW  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
total   0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 -1.2 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
3. Further Analysis by Industries 
The CMS analysis in Subsection IV.2 provided evidence of the crowding-out effect 
and, more recently, the crowded-out effect of China’s exports upon rivals with varying 
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degrees of magnitude depending on the quality segment being discussed. In this 
subsection, we undertake a supplementary analysis of China’s crowding (crowded)-out 
effect across manufacturing sectors by quality segments. 
(1) Low-quality Segment 
According to column (1) in Table 8, the largest part of China’s overall crowding-
out effect of 14 percent in the low-quality segment between 1996 and 2016 comes from 
the sector of machines and electronics (8.5 percent). This is followed by miscellaneous 
(2.3 percent), chemicals (1.3 percent) and metals (1.0 percent). The textile and clothing 
sector (−0.8 percent) and hides and skins sector (−0.2 percent) have been crowded out 
by rivals during the past two decades.  
After breaking up the full period into sub-periods, the dynamics of the crowding-
out effect are more evident. For the first two sub-periods, as shown in columns (2) and 
(3), China crowded out rivals in all manufacturing sectors. The machines and 
electronics sector gained the largest market share. In contrast, in the third sub-period, 
as shown in column (4), as its labor costs rose China began to be crowded out in textiles 
and clothing (−0.7 percent) and wood (−0.1 percent). During this sub-period China still 
achieved a crowding-out effect (0.9 percent) in machines and electronics but the size 
was much diminished compared with previous sub-periods. In the latest sub-period 
however, China was crowded out by as much as a 2.3-percentmarket share in machines 
and electronics, followed by the textile and clothing sector (−0.9 percent) and the hides 
and skins sector (−0.3 percent). For the other sectors, there are positive crowding-out 
effects, but their size is small.  
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Table 8. Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect in Low Segment 











Chemicals(28–38) 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 
Plastic or rubber(39–40) 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Hides and skins (41–43) -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Wood (44–49) 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Textiles and clothing(50–
63) -0.8 0.8 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 
Footwear(64–67) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Stone and glass(68–71) 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Metals (72–73) 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 
Machines and 
electronics(84–85) 8.5% 3.4 6.5 0.9 -2.3 
Transport equipment(86–
89) 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Miscellaneous(90–96) 2.3 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Total  14.0 7.3 9.1 1.0 -3.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
(2) Medium-quality Segment 
In the medium-quality segment, as shown in column (1) in Table 9, the sector most 
responsible for China’s overall crowding-out effect of 8.9 percent between 1996 and 
2016 was machines and electronics (6.9 percent). This is followed by sectors of 
chemicals (0.8 percent), metals (0.6 percent) and transportation equipment (0.5 percent). 
Textiles and clothing (−1.3 percent), stone and glass (−0.3 percent) and footwear (−0.1 
percent) are sectors that have been crowded out by rivals during the past two decades. 
New details emerge when we examine the results in sub-periods. For the first two 
sub-periods, as shown in columns (2) and (3), China crowds out rivals in most sectors, 
with the exceptions of textiles and clothing and stone and glass in the first sub-period. 
China’s largest crowding-out effect is in machines and electronics (2.0 and 3.1 percent, 
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respectively). For the last two sub-periods, China began to be increasingly crowded out 
in textiles and clothing from −0.3 percent in the third sub-period to −1.2 percent in the 
latest sub-period. China also began to be crowded out in the metals sector (−0.1and 
−0.1 percent, respectively).In footwear and miscellaneous it was not until the latest sub-
period that China began to be crowded out by rivals (by −0.2and −0.3 percent, 
respectively). For machines and electronics, China still crowd out rivals but to a reduced 
extent.  
Table 9. Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect by Industry in Medium Segment 
Manufacturing sectors 











Chemicals(28–38) 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Plastic or rubber(39–40) 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Hides and skins (41–43) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wood (44–49) 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Textiles and clothing(50–63) –1.3 –0.2 0.4 –0.3 −1.2 
Footwear(64–67) –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2 
Stone and glass(68–71) –0.3 –0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Metals (72–73) 0.6 0.4 0.5 –0.1 -0.1 
Machines and electronics(84–
85) 
6.9 2.0 3.1 1.3 0.6 
Transport equipment(86–89) 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Miscellaneous(90–96) 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 −0.3 
Total  8.9 3.0 5.5 1.4 −1.1 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
(3) High-quality Segment 
In the high-quality segment, China’s 0.2-percent overall crowding-out effect 
comes from all sectors apart from machines and electronics and miscellaneous between 
1996 and 2016. For the first three sub-periods, China crowds out rivals to a minor 
degree in all sectors apart from miscellaneous (–0.1 percent) in the first sub-period and 
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stone and glass sector (−0.1 percent) in the third sub-period. In the most recent sub-
period, the overall crowding-out effect became a crowded-out effect as in the low-
quality and medium-quality segments. China was crowded out most in machines and 
electronics (0.9 percent), followed by the miscellaneous (−0.3 percent) and stone and 
glass sectors (−0.1 percent). In all other sectors, China maintained a weak crowding-
out effect. 
Table 10. Distribution of China’s Crowding-out Effect by Industry in High Segment (%) 
Manufacturing 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1996–2016 1996–2001 2002–2006 2007–2011 2012–2016 
Chemicals(28–38) 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Plastic or rubber(39–40) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Hides and skins (41–43) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
wood (44–49) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
textiles and clothing(50–63) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Footwear(64–67) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Stone and glass(68–71) 0.0 0.0 0.1 −0.1 −0.1 
Metals (72–73) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Machines and electronics(84–85) −0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.9 
Transport equipment(86–89) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Miscellaneous(90–96) −0.2 −0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.3 
Total  0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 −1.2 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
Relative to lower quality segments, in high-quality segments China’s crowding-
out or crowded-out effect is negligible in size. This demonstrates the weak 
competitiveness change of China’s exports in the high quality segment. China recently 
appears to have made minor progress in transport equipment and plastic or rubber. In 
addition, China gained a negligible share in textiles and clothing, although it lost market 
share in the medium and low-quality segments of this sector. China also recently lost 




The above results suggest that although there has been a massive relocation of 
manufacturing production from developed countries to China and other developing 
countries, the relocation is mainly in lower quality product segments. Therefore, 
although China has emerged as a global manufacturing powerhouse (McKay and Song, 
2010)and accounts for nearly half of the lower quality products in the Japanese 
manufactured goods import market, China is still relatively weak with respect to high-
quality products. Between 1996 and 2016, China’s crowding-out effect in high-quality 
segments is a negligible 0.2 percent, but in low and medium-quality segments the effect 
is 14and 8.9 percent respectively. In addition, the club for suppliers of the high-quality 
product is stable: developed countries have a relatively constant market share. This 
indicates that moving up in the export quality ladder is slow and difficult.  
With its economic development proceeding, China is now facing a crowded-out 
effect in all quality segments. Low-quality product exporters are facing difficulty 
covering rising labor costs because of low profit margins. Since mid-2007, some 
Chinese manufacturers, in particular those in labor-intensive and highly polluting 
industries, have faced pressure to either shut down or relocate due to a number of factors, 
including unfavorable central government policies, a stronger yuan, increasing costs of 
energy and raw materials, strengthening environmental regulations and increased labor 
protections, such as the introduction of a minimum wage (Sharif and Huang, 
2012).Therefore, it was in the low segment that the relatively large shift from a 
crowding-out effect to a crowded-out effect was first observed during the sub-period of 
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2007–2011, mostly with respect to ASEAN competitors in Japan’s market. This was 
then followed by a similar shift in more sectors. For instance, between 2012 and 2016, 
China was crowded out most in the medium-quality textile and clothing sector and high-
quality machines and electronics sector, mostly with respect to ASEAN countries. As 
the labor cost and other costs have continued to rise, if competitiveness cannot outpace 
growing costs, the crowded-out effect would emerge in more sectors and at a larger 
scale. 
The Chinese Government has responded to these challenges by initiating policies 
to assist in moving up the export ladder: China’s launch of “Manufacturing 2025” will 
help to advance it from the lower quality segment to the higher quality one and its Belt 
and Road Initiative will facilitate the relocation of low segment industries to other 
countries (Vangeli, 2017). 
Historically, the loss of market share in the low segment may not be a negative 
development for more developed countries because those losses arise from low value-
added and labor-intensive industries that more developed countries usually do not have 
comparative advantage. In contrast, they can gain welfare by focusing on high value-
added products, the market share of which has not been challenged. Such a win–win 
outcome can be explained by the flying geese model, which was originally proposed by 
Akamatsu(1962)to explain Japan’s upgrade of its manufacturing industries,2 which 
resulted in the relocation of lower value-added industries to other countries, creating 
                                                             
2Japan’s manufacturing industries have moved from labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, to a second tier of 
heavy capital-intensive industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, to a third tier of assembly-oriented industries, 
such as motor vehicles, electronics and machine tools, to a fourth tier of high technology industries, such as 
biotechnology and super-conductors. 
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new leading geese(Lloyd, 1996). Using data from the textile and apparel industry from 
1998 to 2011, Ruan and Zhang (2014) show the existence of the “flying geese” pattern 
of industrial relocation within China. Our empirical analysis complements their finding 
by providing new evidence that the labor-intensive textiles and clothing sector in both 
low-quality and medium-quality segments has been increasingly relocated out of China 
due to rising labor costs. In addition, machines and electronics in the low-quality 
segment, where most of the business in China is in the form of processing trade that 
belongs to the labor-intensive assembly part of the value chain, has experienced similar 
relocation out of China at a greater pace than for low-quality textile and clothing sector. 
Looking ahead, such a crowded-out effect could also be beneficial for both China and 
the recipient countries due to their different comparative advantages. Relocation of 
industries is a natural result of international development. By accepting even this low-
quality segment manufacturing, less developed countries can be integrated into the 
global supply chain, develop their comparative advantage and build up economic and 
other capacity. Our findings demonstrate that less developed countries in ASEAN, that 
is, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam, are gaining market share. This fact is in line with 
ASEAN’s top priority to narrow the development gap with the six older ASEAN 
member states and Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar and Vietnam(The ASEAN Secretariat, 
2016). Further relocation of low-quality manufacturing from China to other developing 
countries, such as Cambodia and Vietnam, will further advance the level of 
industrialization in these countries, in addition to environmental benefits that have 
recently been demonstrated(Han et al., 2018). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Product quality is an important dimension in the recent theoretical and empirical 
international trade research. By employing the most detailed HS nine-digit product-
level data and the recent extension of CMS methodology, this paper has provided 
evidence of crowding-out and crowded-out effects across different product quality 
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segments and across manufacturing sectors, which complements the previous related 
literature. We also undertook a supplementary analysis of China’s crowding(ed) out 
effect across manufacturing sectors by quality segments. 
The results show that a crowding-out effect exists for China’s exports in all quality 
segments in almost all sectors between 1996 and 2006. However, during the sub-period 
of 2007–2011, this crowding-out effect became a crowded-out effect in the low-quality 
segment in the textile and clothing sector and wood sector, especially with respect to 
ASEAN countries. This displacement of China’s exports coincided with when it 
became an upper–middle-income country. The shift from crowding-out to crowded-out 
also occurred in the medium-quality and high-quality segments in the most recent sub-
period in more sectors between 2012 and 2016. The present paper observes that 
industrial relocation is a natural phenomenon in international development. However, 
initially most of the relocation occurred in the low-quality segment.  
Based on this discussion, the following policy implications can be drawn. The 
findings suggest that rather than being an exception, China is following the well-known 
“flying geese” pattern of development previously traveled by other East Asian 
economies. The crowded-out effect is in line with the industrial relocation that is behind 
the “East Asian Miracle” and, thus, could achieve win–win outcomes for countries 
involved. China has previously been a beneficiary of export orientation and industrial 
relocation and now lower income countries are also benefiting as China itself becomes 
a driver of the next wave of industrial relocation.  
Lower-income developing economies such as those in ASEAN would do well to 
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be open to receive those relocated low value-added industries for their own benefit in 
promoting economic and capacity development through participation in the 
international supply chain. While it may be low value-added, less technologically 
advanced and labor-intensive, specialization in the production and export of low-quality 
products could provide the impetus to transform from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy. In contrast, less developed countries should not rush to leapfrog up the export 
ladder as even China, after decades of development, is only starting to move from the 
low-quality segment to the medium-quality segment. ASEAN countries should 
welcome international relocation to their less developed members as a way to promote 
the narrowing development gap to which ASEAN aspires. 
However, climbing up the product quality ladder takes time, and, thus, the 
relocation policy in China is best implemented gradually. Although China needs to 
climb the export ladder due to rising labor costs, its policy of industrial relocation 
should not be too radical or sudden. The stability in high segments indicates that it is 
not an easy task to break through. Considering the rising labor costs, foreign direct 
investment outflows and the resulting industrial reallocation across ASEAN countries, 
especially the lower income developing members, it is likely that China will see losses 




Akamatsu, K., 1962, “A historical pattern of economic growth in developing Countries,” 
The Developing Economies, Vol. 1, pp. 3–25. 
Anh-Dao, T. T., 2010, “Vietnam’s export performance in the face of China’s 




Baak, S., 2014, “Do Chinese and Korean products compete in the Japanese market? An 
investigation of machinery exports,” Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, Vol. 34, pp. 256–71. 
Batista, J. C., 2008, “Competition between Brazil and other exporting countries in the 
US import market: A new extension of constant-market-shares analysis,” Applied 
Economics, Vol. 40, No. 19, pp. 2477–87. 
Batista, J. C. and Y. Liu, 2017, “Export quality and the dynamics of North–South 
competition,” World Economy, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 207–32. 
CEIC, 2017, “CEIC database” [online; cited 16 August 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en. 
Cheptea, A., L. Fontagnéand S. Zignago, 2014, “European export performance,” 
Review of World Economics, Vol. 150, No. 1, pp. 25–58. 
Du, Y. and Y. Lu, 2018, “The Great Opening up and the Roadmap for the Future: The 
Story of China’s International Trade”, China & World Economy, Vol. 26 No.2, pp 
68–93. 
Eichengreen, B., Y. Rhee and H. Tong, 2007, “China and the exports of other Asian 
countries,” Review of World Economics, Vol. 143, No. 2, pp. 201–26. 
Fagerberg, J. and G. Sollie, 1987, “The method of constant market shares analysis 
reconsidered,” Applied Economics, Vol. 19, No. 12, pp. 1571–83. 
Fontagné, L., G. Gaulier and S. Zignago, 2008, “Specialization across varieties and 
North-South competition,”Economic Policy, Vol. 23, pp. 51–91. 
Greenaway, D., A. Mahabir and C. Milner, 2008, “Has China displaced other Asian 
countries’ exports?” China Economic Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 152–69. 
Holst, D. R. and J. Weiss, 2004, “ASEAN and China: Export rivals or partners in 
regional growth?” World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 1255–74. 
Han, L., Han, B., Shi, X., Su, B., Lv, X., Lei, X., 2018. Energy efficiency convergence 
across countries in the context of China’s Belt and Road initiative. Applied Energy, 
Vol. 213, pp112-122.  
 
Lin, Y., 2015, “Is China Relinquishing Manufacturing Competitiveness to Mexico in 
US Markets?”, China and World Economy, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 104–124. 
Lloyd, P. J., 1996, “The role of foreign investment in the success of Asian 
industrialization,”Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 407–33. 
McKay, H. and L. Song, 2010, “China as a Global Manufacturing Powerhouse: 
Strategic Considerations and Structural Adjustment”, China & World Economy, 
Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 1–32. 
Schott, P. K., 2004, “Across-product versus within-product specialization in 
international trade,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, pp. 
647–78. 
Sharif, N. and C. Huang, 2012, “Innovation strategy, firm survival and relocation: The 
case of Hong Kong-owned manufacturing in Guangdong Province, China,” 
Research Policy, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 69–78. 
The ASEAN Secretariat, 2016, “Initiative for ASEAN integration (IAI) work plan III,” 




Tyszynski, H., 1951, “World Trade in Manufactured Commodities, 1899‐1950,” 
Manchester School, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 272–304. 
Vangeli, A., 2017, “China’s Engagement with the Sixteen Countries of Central, East 
and Southeast Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative”, China and World 
Economy, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 101–124. 
World Trade Organisation, 2017, “World Trade Statistical Review 2017” [online; cited 
26 October 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts17_toc_e.htm. 
 
 
